Καταγγελία από Μαρούσι για Λιόλιο σε ΔΟΕ, FIBA, Euroleague!

Η ΚΑΕ Μαρούσι καταγγέλλει τον Λιόλιο για σύγκρουση συμφερόντων, παρουσιάζοντας μηνύματα και στοιχεία που, όπως υποστηρίζει, δείχνουν εμπλοκή του στη διοίκηση του Προμηθέα, σε μεταγραφές παικτών, αλλά και γνώση ορισμών διαιτητών πριν από την επίσημη ανακοίνωσή τους.

Αναλυτικά η καταγγελία:

The Basketball Société Anonyme under the corporate name “GYMNASTIKOS SYLLOGOS AMAROUSIOU 1896 S.A.”, having its registered seat in Marousi, Attica (Dionysou & Niovis Streets), with Tax Identification Number 996541272, duly and lawfully represented by its Chief Executive Officer, Mr. Theofanis Tranatoros (hereinafter: “the Complainant”), legally represented by Elli Perraki.-

AGAINST:

Mr. Evangelos Liolios, son of Panagiotis and Anastasia, residing in Patras, Achaia (18 Girokomeiou Street), holder of Tax Identification Number 040895240 (hereinafter: “the Respondent”).-

NOTIFICATION TO:

FIBA Disciplinary Committee

Euroleague

Ministry of Sports Greece

A! SUBJECT MATTER OF THE COMPLAINT

1. Background

• 1.1.- The Complainant’s basketball department, established in 1950, competed continuously in the top-tier Greek basketball league (formerly A1, currently GBL) from 1998 until 2012. During the period 2000–2010, the Complainant achieved notable domestic and international success, including, inter alia, winning the Saporta Cup (2001), participating in the FIBA Europe League Final, reaching the Greek Championship Finals (2004), and advancing to the Euroleague Top 16 (2009/2010 season).-
• 1.2.- The subsequent decline in sporting performance was directly attributable to the severe and unprecedented financial crisis affecting Greece.-
• 1.3.- Since the 2023/2024 season, the Complainant has undertaken a structured revival, supported by substantial private investment, with the objectives of: (a) re-establishing itself among the elite clubs of Greek basketball ; (b) contributing to the competitiveness and development of the Greek championship ; and (c) fostering the development of emerging athletes for national representation .-
• 1.4.- Notwithstanding public statements made by the Respondent in his capacity as President of the Hellenic Basketball Federation (hereinafter: “HBF”), emphasizing integrity, transparency, and investment security, such statements have not been substantiated in practice.-
• 1.5.- On the contrary, the Respondent’s conduct, as detailed herein, demonstrates a material divergence between stated principles and actual practice.-

2. Grounds for Filing

• 2.1.- In light of: (a) the Complainant’s sporting course; (b) its current competitive planning for the 2025/2026 season; (c) relevant professional engagements; and (d) recently acquired information of substantial evidentiary value;
• 2.2.- The Complainant has resolved to file the present Complaint, fully cognizant of its gravity, with the primary objective of safeguarding the integrity of the sport of basketball.-
• 2.3.- The Complainant has already deposited complaint before Hellenic Basketball Federation (Exhibit 1).-

3. Legal Basis and Jurisdiction

3.1.- The present Complaint is directed against the Respondent on the grounds that his actions constitute direct violations of:

• FIBA Code of Ethics section titled “Preamble” par. 117-121par. 139-144 section titled “Conflict of Interest” and 145-148 section titled “Disclosure of Conflict of Interests

• Articles 1, 3, and 4 of the HBF Code of Ethics;

• 3.2.- FIBA is competent for the following reasons:
• 3.2.1.- FIBA has jurisdiction over National Federations (here Hellenic Basketball Federation) and their officials (including Presidents) and the complaint includes matters goverbed by FIBA Code of Ethics (ed. 4th December 2025).-
• 3.2.2.- As it is stated in FIBA’s statutes, ethics rules apply to “FIBA officials” and “Basketball parties” under national federations. A federation president, as E. Liolios is, acts within the FIBA structure and is bound by FIBA governance standards.-
• 3.2.3.- The complaint at hand, is about Hellenic Basketball Federation’s (hereinafter “HBF”) President E. Liolios who de facto controls and runs a club and uses Federation’s power to benefit the Club he runs “Promitheas Patras”.-

4. Shareholding and Pre-Election Conduct

• 4.1.- Prior to his election as President of HBF, the Respondent held controlling interest (86.62%) in the basketball club Promitheas Patras S.A.
• 4.2.- In July 2020, shortly before the deadline for candidacy, he formally transferred his shareholding as follows:

• 30% to Mr. Charalambos Michalopoulos; • 30% to Mr. Athanasios Triantafyllidis; • 24.62% to Mr. Angelos Zannis.

• 4.3 It is noted that: i)the spouse of Mr. Michalopoulos currently serves as a member of the Board of Directors of the HBF and b) Mr A. Zannis is husband of Reaspodent’s sister.-

5.- Election

• 5.1.- The Respondent was elected President of the HBF on 12th September 2021and re-elected on 15th September 2024.-

6.- De Facto Control of Promitheas Patras BC SA and Conflict of Interest

• 6.1.- Notwithstanding the formal[?] transfer of shares, the Respondent has at all material times retained de facto control over Promitheas Patras S.A..-
• 6.2.- The Respondent simultaneously exercises: (a) the institutional authority of President of the HBF; and (b) effective managerial control over a professional basketball club Promitheas Patras SA. While practicing his managerial responsibilities, he was abusing his power coming from his position as HBF President in favor of his team.-
• 6.3.- Such dual capacity constitutes a manifest conflict of interest, in violation of [as in detail referred above par. 3.1]: • the HBF Code of Ethics; • the FIBA Code of Ethics; and • the Greek constitutional principle of equality.
• 6.4.- The Respondent has, through the exercise of his institutional authority, conferred undue and preferential advantage upon said club.-

B! FACTUAL CIRCUMSTANCES

7.- Documentary Evidence (Electronic Communications)

• 7.1.- The Complainant relies upon a series of electronic communications (via WhatsApp and Viber), exchanged between the Respondent and former coach Mr. Ilias Papatheodorou during the period 2023–2025 [Exhibits 2 and 3]. Those exhibits are evidence that the Respodent runs the Promitheas Patras effectively and his role is dominat and invasive in all the matters.-
• 7.2.- Said communications unequivocally demonstrate that: (a) the Respondent exercises decisive influence over player transfers and roster composition; (b) he directly participates in financial negotiations, including player remuneration; (c) he maintains direct contact with players and agents; (d) he formulates and dictates strategic sporting decisions; and (e) he exercises effective control over the club’s operations.
• 7.3.- (i!) Player selection and direct communication with players:

From the messages set out below, it is evident that he communicates directly with players and urges his associates to contact players’ agent Spanos. Furthermore, he makes predictions as to the position in which Promitheas will finish in the Greek Championship and, finally, by improperly exploiting his capacity as President of the Hellenic Basketball Federation (HBF), he indicates that he would also engage in discussions with national team player Lountzis.

• On 14.7.2023, E. Liolios informs I. Papatheodorou as follows: “Tanoulis has signed to leave Promitheas and go to Olympiacos!!!”

I. Papatheodorou asks him:

“Did we receive the money??? Shall we move on?” and E. Liolios continues:

“Of course—even if it were 300, he would pay it.”

Note: Olympiacos BC paid an amount of one hundred fifty thousand (€150,000) to Promitheas Patras BC for the acquisition of Giorgos Tanoulis. In total, the acquisition of the aforementioned player cost three hundred thousand euros (€300,000).

• On 20.7.2023, he states verbatim:

“Ilias, good evening. Sorry for bothering you on your name day. Question: Are we interested in Alex Antetokounmpo?”

• On 8.7.2023, he states verbatim:

“A useful piece of information. Chougkaz’s girlfriend is from Patras. When you speak with Spanós or with him, let me know.”

• On 21.6.2024, he states verbatim:

“Sign Lountzis yesterday. Now it requires discussion through Tasos. If I need to do anything, let me know. I will have him with the National Team for so many days…”

• On 17.12.2024, he states verbatim:

“Ilias, congratulations for today. But not only for today. I will remind you of the message I sent you on October 23, after our loss… Ilias, I will tell you my opinion about the game, with absolute honesty. There are some defeats that are often better than victories. I will also tell you from now my prediction for the team. First, it will advance to the Round of 16 and possibly to the quarterfinals of the BCL. In Greece, we will enter the top four. In the Cup, the usual…”

• On 31.12.2024, he states verbatim:

“Good morning. I spoke with Igoundou. 10 minutes. I told him what needed to be said, as it should be said: ‘You are a professional, you are very intelligent. Play not only for your stats but also for the team to win. That way you will secure a good contract next year. Otherwise, if you do not care about the team, the team cannot care about you. And in the end, you will lose. You are very intelligent. Think about what I told you and act accordingly…’

Of course, Ilias, he is a liar. He started telling me how nice Patras is, the team, etc. I cut him off and told him: There are better cities than Patras and better teams than Promitheas, but this is my home. And this year you are here. If you want to go somewhere better next year… (and I told him the above). A liar and a trickster. But clever—how? You should check whether he is really performing… Something about him does not sit well with me. No comparison with the previous ones.”

• On 05.02.2025, E. Liolios [E.L.] forwards to I. Papatheodorou [I.P.] the following message:

“Good evening, President. Apologies for the disturbance. Today I received inquiries from Panathinaikos and Olympiacos regarding Karagiannidis. I referred them to the team. I assume you have been informed, but I thought it proper that you should know.”

He states that he received this from a player agent, and then comments:

“The trouble has begun,” and continues: “On Thursday I will speak with Karagiannidis so he does not lose focus.”

I.P.: “Understood” E.L.: “Have you told Christos about the offer?” I.P.: “No, I haven’t spoken with him” E.L.: “I will tell him about the interest from the two big clubs and our price: 500” Ultimately, A. Karagiannidis signed with Olympiacos for a fee of five hundred thousand euros (€500,000), while the player remained with Promitheas on loan.

• On 15.3.2025, he states verbatim:

“He is a good player. And suitable for Promitheas. He does everything well. But not for a higher level. Very impactful and effective in the game. Nothing unnecessary… I also have another one. Short… very good. Freshman… but others have noticed him too… They are offering him 1 million next year from another college. He is basically done. And this is an opportunity to grab him now. I will find out who his agent is.”

(ii!) From the following messages it emerges that:

E. Liolios characterizes himself as the “boss” of the team—something which, in any event, does not come as a surprise, as he was and continues to be so. It is further demonstrated that he continues, in practice, to act as President of Promitheas Patras BC, and that these duties take priority over his duties as President of the Hellenic Basketball Federation (HBF). Moreover, he expressly states his actual intention to protect his team. This constitutes further strong evidence of his conflicting and mutually incompatible roles. Message – 9.4.2024

“Ilias, congratulations!!! Not only for today but for the entire European run. Congratulations to the players and the staff—pass it on to them. Unfortunately, I could not manage to be close to the team today due to certain HBF obligations I had in Athens. However, the most important thing is to help the team and protect it. For today’s defeat, the responsibility lies entirely with me…”[STRONG EVIDENCE – preferential loyalty to a specific club]

This message shows personal responsibility and protective role toward a specific club and indicates identification with club management, incompatible with neutral federation role Message – 18.5.2024

“When you speak with them… tell them the following: I know the ‘boss’s button.’ When you don’t ask for a specific amount and say ‘whatever you think,’ you always get more… If they have faith, they will sign on a blank sheet…” [STRONG EVIDENCE – control over financial negotiations] This message i) demonstrates direct involvement in contract negotiation strategy, ii) indicates effective control over club financial decisions and iii)is incompatible with independent federation office

(iii!) Admission of De Facto Control

Message – 27.6.2024

“Ilias, I am flying to Thessaloniki and therefore I have a bit of time to relax, and that is why I am writing you this message. Regarding what I told you earlier. I believe that the image we present to the public, but above all to ourselves, is not the image of a team with character and cohesion. It is a team capable of the best but also of the worst. It does not have a stable identity. That is the issue, because in this way we do not build foundations for the future. What matters is not a single game nor a single season. What matters is continuity.

Personally, every action I take has both an immediate and a long-term result. I do not plan anything solely for today. I consider the sum of today and tomorrow and I choose the best total (which may be smaller for today). And when I say tomorrow, I mean at least three years.

Thus, when the team started, in the initial period we were looking at the overall total. I believe that now we are not looking at the overall total but only at today. And this has passed on to the team, to the players.

For everything that happens within the team, the primary responsibility lies with the management (mainly me) and then with the staff (mainly you). The players follow. Therefore, I am to blame for the climate that has developed within the team. But so are you.

At the beginning, faithful to the plan, we were focusing on the present and the future. On building. At some point, we aimed for ‘something more’ for this year and that carried us away. Because we said: maybe this is the opportunity this year? And this passed on to the players.

And what did they think (internally)? Since you set short-term goals (only today and not tomorrow), then we will do the same. Not today against Lavrio but on Tuesday against Murcia. From their side, they are right. We gave them this right with our change of stance. From our side, therefore, we are wrong.

That is why I told you: for me, Europe is over. Because we cannot do everything. And if we lose focus with fantasies about a Final Four, etc., then we will lose the future. Unfortunately, we are not yet a ‘professional’ team, with professional players, with a level of mental clarity and maturity. We are a good family.

Therefore, I believe that the team needs tuning again (as you say?). But not tactical tuning. Rather, a re-adjustment of objectives. That is why I said that for me Europe is over.

Remember the objectives we had set at the beginning: Cup (achieved), position in the top four (pending), development (pending), and Europe—next round (achieved). Therefore, competitively we must fight and give everything for the Greek championship.

However, we must not forget the primary objective: building the roster of the future. The young players (Bazinas, Plotas, Karagiannidis), as well as whichever Greek and foreign players remain next year. (We have set aside this objective for the future team.)

For now… let us put it back on the table…” [CRITICAL EVIDENCE – de facto management] • Explicit admission of being the primary decision-maker of the club • This is core proof of conflict of interest under FIBA rules

In detail some of its points:

“…Personally, every action I take has both an immediate and a long-term result… I consider the sum of today and tomorrow…” [SUPPORTING EVIDENCE – strategic control showing long-term planning authority, typical of executive management ] “…That is why I told you: for me, Europe is over… we must focus on the Greek championship…” [STRONG EVIDENCE – sporting decision authority, Indicates direct influence over competitive strategy ] “…we must not forget the primary objective: building the roster of the future…”[STRONG EVIDENCE – roster control, confirming involvement in player development and squad planning] (iv) Financial Control

Message – 31.7.2023

“I think Liotsos will push us a bit more regarding the money… I think we should refuse. I will tell you my reasoning. First of all, it is a lot of money and he does not deserve it. Secondly, there will be unfairness toward the others. Thirdly, I do not like someone using the National Team for opportunistic personal promotion. Solutions: in practice, there are no reliable options at the level of Greek players. I believe that proper reinforcement must be made with foreign players, and if he does not reduce his demands, then with young players (Bazinas, Plotas, Lagios or perhaps someone else) who can help. I do not like being pressured and dancing to the rhythm set by others.” In particular:

“I think Liotsos will push us further on the money… I think we should refuse… it is a lot of money and he does not deserve it… there will be unfairness toward the others…” [STRONG EVIDENCE – salary decision-making]

Those sentences show the direct evaluation and decision-making on player salaries and shows active financial governance of the club “I do not like someone using the National Team for opportunistic personal promotion.” [RELEVANT – misuse of institutional position, indicating awareness and possible leveraging of national team status]

Message – 2.8.2023 “Three-year deal: 110–125–140. With 10 in the first and second year so that we can exit.” [CRITICAL EVIDENCE – contract structuring] Here we have i)Direct involvement in contract terms and exit clauses and ii)Strong indicator of executive authority within the club

7.4.- The Respondent explicitly acknowledges his role as the principal decision-maker, including statements attributing primary responsibility for the club’s operations to himself.-

• 8. Referee Appointment Irregularities
• 8.1.- The Respondent is shown to have had prior knowledge of referee appointments before their official publication.
• 8.2.- In a communication dated 5 March 2025, he disclosed the designated referees for an upcoming match, explicitly characterizing the information as “strictly confidential.”
• 8.3.- Such conduct constitutes a serious breach of:
• (a) the confidentiality governing referee appointments; and
• (b) the independence of the Central Refereeing Committee.

The message was the following: “I don’t know whether it matters or not. But the trio for Saturday is: Vaso, Stefanos, Christinakis. I just asked and found out. But be careful—this is strictly confidential. I don’t know whether the referees themselves are aware of it yet.”

• 9.- Additional Circumstances
• 9.1.- The Respondent maintains close personal and professional relationships with key refereeing officials.-
• 9.2.- Multiple matches involving Promitheas Patras S.A. have given rise to significant controversy concerning officiating decisions. Those matches were the following:

From the press reports submitted herewith, which concern the incident-filled match between Promitheas and AEK on 16 November 2024 (7th round), the referees appointed were Vaso Tsaroucha, Nondas Christinakis, and Manos Tsolakos. The match was interrupted on multiple occasions due to strong reactions from AEK supporters against the officiating, which ultimately withdrew following intense protests from the crowd.

Reasonable question:

Was the participation of Tsaroucha and Christinakis in the officiating once again a mere “coincidence”? Furthermore, in the 22nd round Basket League match on 23 March 2025 between Kolossos Rhodes BC and PAOK BC, where PAOK was defeated 84–83 by Kolossos, the refereeing crew consisted of Vaso Tsaroucha, Stefanos Maglogiannis, and Giorgos Katrachouras.

Reasonable question:

Was this appointment again coincidental? The outcome of that match affected the league standings to the benefit of Promitheas. Indeed, PAOK, being unable to overlook the refereeing decisions—characterized as “surgical”—issued an official statement regarding the match, particularly in light of the fact that Kolossos was awarded a total of forty-seven (47) free throws. The head coach of PAOK, Massimo Cancellieri, refused to participate in the customary post-match press conference.

Finally, was the appointment of Tsaroucha, Skandalakis, and Angelis in the match between Promitheas and Aris on 24 January 2026 likewise coincidental, when their refereeing decisions led Aris—despite its victory over Promitheas Patras—to issue an official statement regarding those decisions? (It is noted that in the said match, forty-six (46) free throws were awarded in favor of Promitheas Patras BC.)

9.3.- The cumulative evidence raises serious concerns regarding a) undue influence; b) lack of impartiality; and c) institutional interference.-

10.- Returning, therefore, to the aforementioned statements of E. Liolios (see para. 1.4 point b!), at some point a reasonable explanation must be provided to all of us as to by what authority and through what mechanism, acting in a manner contrary to ethical standards, institutional propriety, and in violation of every notion of equality before the law, E. Liolios was aware—two days prior to the official announcement—of the composition of the refereeing crew for the aforementioned GBL match.-

10.1.- Furthermore, the question arises as to whether S. Koukoulekidis, President of the Central Refereeing Committee (CRC) of the HBF, was informed that E. Liolios knew in advance the refereeing trio that was to be appointed.-

10.2.- It is noted that, in October 2024, the following appointments were made:

(a) H. Koromilas was appointed as special advisor on refereeing matters; and

(b) S. Koukoulekidis was appointed as the “reformer of Greek refereeing,” [on the date of his appointment], replacing Ch. Christodoulou, whom E. Liolios had also previously appointed as “reformer of Greek refereeing” in October 2022, accompanied by his notorious statement: “I gave a blank cheque to Christos Christodoulou to change everything. They used to treat me with contempt and underestimate me. But now that I have become president of the federation, they flatter me. They have nothing to gain from this, because they do not know that I am the same person. Over all these years, I have seen children cry because of refereeing injustice. If I ever see even one child crying again, the person responsible will be kicked out. I also went through refereeing, but only for one year—I could not endure it any longer. This troubled me, and it should trouble all of you.”

10.3.- In his sworn statement before notary public dated 15 April 2026, Ilias Papatheodorou states:

“He had also told me that he considered referees Vaso Tsaroucha, Stefanos Maglogiannis and Nondas Christinakis to be good referees and that he trusted them. He had an excellent relationship with Stratos Koukoulekidis and was a friend of Ilias Koromilas. With Ilias Koromilas, I saw them dining together at the Patras Sailing Club, as well as meeting at the offices of Promitheas, at PROMITHEAS PARK, which is owned by Vangelis Liolios.”

The reasonable and well-intentioned sports fan is left to wonder:

• How many club owners possess the ability that E Liolios has, to be friends with and dine together alongside leading institutional figures of Greek basketball, such as S. Koukoulékidis and Ilias Koromilas?
• How far might this “friendly relationship” have extended?
• To what extent are these interactions between the President of the HBF and refereeing officials institutional in nature?
• How is it that the aforementioned trio of referees, referenced in the submitted SMS, enjoys the trust of the President of the HBF, while at the same time the officiating of these very individuals provokes a wave of reactions from fans across the country?

10.4.- Finally, E. Liolios will ultimately be required to clarify whose interests he was in fact serving.

We respond: certainly not those of Greek basketball as a whole, as is required and mandated by his institutional position as President of the HBF… (!!!!).

C! LEGAL VIOLATIONS

11.- FIBA Code of Ethics

11.1.- The Respondent’s conduct constitutes violations of the abovementioned section titled “Preamble” par. 117-121par. 139-144 section titled “Conflict of Interest”and 145-148 section titled “Disclosure of Conflict of Interests FIBA Code of Ethics, including:

• engaging in conflicts of interest; • granting preferential treatment; • exploiting confidential information; and • acting in a manner incompatible with his official duties.

Alongside with the Statutes of HBF Art. 18 and Code of Ethics Art. 1,2,4

The Respondent has violated, inter alia:

• the duty to act with integrity and impartiality; • the prohibition against abuse of position; • the obligation to disclose conflicts of interest; and • the duty to avoid conduct prejudicial to the integrity of the sport.

12.- The Respondent’s actions further contravene the provisions governing: i) institutional governance; ii) integrity of sport; and iii) proper functioning of regulatory bodies.-

13.1.- Taking into account the aforementioned provisions: a) of the applicable Sports Law, b) of the regulations of the Hellenic Basketball Federation (HBF), and c) of the applicable regulations and Code of Ethics of FIBA, all of which are fully applicable in the present case, given that E. Liolios serves as President of the HBF, which is subject to the authority of FIBA, it follows that: where the powers and duties of the President of the HBF are exercised by the same individual who manages – whether formally or de facto – a professional basketball club, or where such club constitutes a club of his direct or indirect interests, this situation gives rise to a manifest conflict of interest within the meaning of the FIBA Code of Ethics.

13.2.- In such circumstances, a clear and binding obligation of disclosure arises (duty of disclosure), requiring the President to declare such dual capacity, precisely because of the existence of this evident conflict of interest.-

13.2.1.- This dual capacity, by its very nature, inevitably leads to the adoption of biased and partial decisions in favor of the club under his control, and consequently to the detriment of other clubs, since the individual in question derives a direct or indirect benefit from the sporting success of said club. Under FIBA Code of Ethics, such conduct constitutes a breach of fundamental principles, including: the duty of impartiality, the prohibition of preferential treatment, and the prohibition of misuse of position for personal or third-party benefit.-

13.2.2.-Accordingly, any person holding such dual capacity is under a strict obligation to recuse himself (duty to recuse)from exercising the duties either of President of the HBF or of the club which he administers.-

13.2.3.-This obligation arises not only from the applicable regulations, statutory law, and constitutional principles, but also from the generally accepted principles of common experience and logic, which are always applicable.-

13.2.4.-Failing such recusal, as is the case herein, a situation of institutional incompatibility and abuse of authority is created, whereby the same individual effectively exercises control over both the decision-making authority and the beneficiary thereof (“the same person decides and benefits”).-

14.- In the present case, E. Liolios concealed his dual capacity as the de facto administrator of PROMITHEAS PATRAS BC and, at the same time, continues to exercise the functions of President of the HBF. Such conduct constitutes: i) manifest violation of Article 4 of the HBF Code of Ethics, and ii) direct breach of the FIBA Code of Ethics, in particular the provisions governing conflict of interest, independence, and integrity.-

15.1.- More specifically: E. Liolios exercises de facto control over PROMITHEAS PATRAS BC,takes all decisions relating to both the financial and sporting operations of the said club, and simultaneously promotes said club in an unfair, unethical, and improper manner, to the detriment of other clubs, while exercising the powers of President of the HBF. In other words, he exercises his institutional functions while engaging in a clear abuse of power (abuse of position), in violation of the core principles of the FIBA Code of Ethics.-

15.2.1.- In support of the above conclusions, a series of communications between E. Liolios and the former head coach of PROMITHEAS PATRAS BC, I. Papatheodorou, are submitted, which demonstrate that: i)he acts as de facto President of the club, ii) selects players, iii) directs and/or personally conducts negotiations regarding players’ remuneration, and iv)attempts to direct and/or influence the sporting outcomes of matches.-

15.2.2.- Such conduct constitutes direct evidence of violations of the FIBA Code of Ethics, including: lack of integrity, absence of impartiality, and exercise of undue influence over the sport.-

16.- In summary: By exploiting his position as President of the HBF, and simultaneously continuing to exercise, without impediment, the de facto administration of PROMITHEAS PATRAS BC, E.

Liolios: seeks, beyond any doubt, and by all means deriving from his institutional authority, in violation of the principles of equality and fair competition, to ensure that the club which he continues to control, in a covert and indirect manner, achieves the most favorable possible sporting outcomes.-

17.- By acting in this manner, he directly violates: not only the provisions on conflict of interest of GreekLaw 2725/1999, the Code of Ethics of the HBF, but also the provisions of FIBA Code of Ethics, in particular the provisions relating to conflict of interest, preferential treatment, and abuse of position.-

D! Jurisdiction and Applicable Framework

18.1.- The present matter falls within the jurisdiction of FIBA, as it concerns the conduct of the President of the Hellenic Basketball Federation, a national federation affiliated with and bound by FIBA regulations.-

18.2.- The applicable legal framework includes: i) the FIBA Code of Ethics; ii) the internal regulations and Code of Ethics of the HBF; iii)Greek Sports Law (Law 2725/1999); iv)fundamental principles of equality and fair competition.-

i) Conflict of Interest (Fundamental Violation)

• 19.- It is established that Mr. Evangelos Liolios simultaneously: exercises the powers of President of the HBF; and maintains de facto control and administration over PROMITHEAS PATRAS BC. This dual capacity constitutes a manifest and prohibited conflict of interest, within the meaning of the FIBA Code of Ethics.-
• 19.1.- Under FIBA rules: i) officials must act with independence and impartiality; ii) any personal or third-party interest must be disclosed; iii) situations of conflict must be avoided or remedied through recusal.-
• 19.2.- In the present case: i)no disclosure was made; ii)no recusal occurred; and iii) the dual role was actively exercised.- So: A direct and continuing breach of FIBA conflict-of-interest provisions.- ii) Breach of Impartiality and Preferential Treatment
• 20.- The Respondent, by virtue of his dual role, has: i) promoted a specific club (PROMITHEAS PATRAS BC); ii) exercised influence over sporting and financial decisions affecting said club; iii)acted to its advantage to the detriment of competing teams.- Such conduct violates: a)the principle of neutrality; and b)the prohibition of preferential treatment under the FIBA Code of Ethics.- iii)Abuse of Position (Abuse of Power)
• 21.- The Respondent has used his institutional authority as President of HBF: while, simultaneously, acting in the interests of a specific club under his control. This constitutes: a) abuse of position, b) misuse of institutional authority,c) undermining of governance integrity.-

iv) Lack of Integrity and Undue Influence

• 22.- Evidence (including communications submitted) demonstrates that the Respondent: a)participates in player selection and negotiations; b)determines financial terms; c) attempts to influence sporting outcomes.- Such actions constitute: a) undue influence over the sport,andd, b)violation of integrity obligations under FIBA rules.- v) Violation of Equality and Fair Competition
• 23.- By exercising dual authority, the Respondent: i)distorts competitive balance, and ii) creates structural inequality among clubs.- This violates: a) the principle of equal treatment; and b) the integrity of competitions governed by FIBA.-

E! CONCLUSIONS

• 24.1.- The Respondent’s simultaneous roles are inherently incompatible and give rise to structural bias. Such dual capacity inevitably results in preferential treatment and undermines competitive fairness.-
• 24.2.- The Respondent has exercised his authority in a manner that constitutes abuse of power, to the detriment of other clubs.-
• 24.3.-The Respondent’s conduct violates the constitutionally protected principle of equality, as well as the fundamental principles of fair competition.-

25.- The Respondent’s conduct constitutes systemic and ongoing violations of the FIBA Code of Ethics, including: i) conflict of interest, ii) abuse of position iii) preferential treatment and iv) lack of integrity.-

F! In light of the foregoing,

The Complainant respectfully

A) Points out the urgency of the complaint, as it’s a matter that influences a) Greek Championship 2025/2026 and b) the referees’ appointments consequently it is time sensitive complaint and: B) Requests this Honorable Committee initiate a full investigation into the acts and omissions described herein, for the purpose of determining whether disciplinary or other violations have been committed; C) Summon the Complainant in case of formal hearing in relation to the present matter; and

1) Complaint, dated 16/04/2026 before Hellenic Basketball Federation.- 2) Full set of electronic communications via WhatsApp and Viber between E Liolios and I. Papatheodorou.- 3) Sworn witness statement of Ilias Papatheodorou, dated 15 April 2026, before Notary Public.- 4) Relevant press publications.-

Athens, 24th April 2026 For the Complainant, The Chief Executive Officer